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MONEY TALKS AND POLICY WALKS: THE




Americans live within the invisible realm of the Administrative
State, 1 which, in turn, controls their air, water, food, health,
schooling, and workplaces. The power of the administrative bu-
reaucracy is far-reaching, subject in the Executive Branch to
Presidential oversight.2 The vast discretion of this oversight func-
tion, however, can be tainted by political campaign money. If
tainted, the fidelity of the presidential advisers to their donor
groups affects the ways in which this oversight can move, halt, or
direct the Administrative State.3 This article posits a means by
which disclosure can be a counterweight against undue impacts of
campaign donor influence on administrative decisions.
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. J.D. Univeristy of Virginia; B.A. Boston
College.
1 See EMMETrE REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1969) (noting term "ad-
ministrative state" is taken from and connotes pervasive interplay between regulatory agencies and pri-
vate sector); see also Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Proc-
ess, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (describing extensive nature of administrative state as "a regime
some fifty-five agencies big, whose decisions fill 50 volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
and produce over one million Federal Register pages each year"); Cynthia R. Farina,On Misusing
"Revolution " and "Reform ": Procedural Due Process and the New Welfare Act, 50ADMIN. L. REV.
591, 630 (1998) (stating that administrative state has helped destroy distinction between public and
private realm); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation For Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 177 (1997) (describing administrative agencies as
fourth branch of government).
2 See Croley, supra note 1, at 119 (observing that implementation of agency rules is subject to
Presidential oversight); Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decision-
making, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 447-53 (1987) (describing benefits of Presidential oversight, such as
greater accountability, reduction of bureaucratic rigidity, and more functional rules).
3 See Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A Proposal for a
"Republican " Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444, 459-60 (1996) (stating that "White House in-
tervention may undermine the relatively open, public rulemaking process of agencies by allowing spe-
cial interests with Presidential connections to exert undue influence"); Mark SeidenfeldA Big Picture
Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency Policy-Making, 80IOWA L. REV. 1, 19 (1994) (explain-
ing that presidential bias may affect regulatory outcomes, thus benefiting special interest groups).
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I. THE ISSUE OF DONOR INFLUENCE
The President, the Cabinet, and the executive agencies each
have roles in the formulation of national policies. 4 President
Truman's famous "The Buck Stops Here" desk sign epitomizes the
President's responsibility to make tough policy decisions with re-
spect to domestic and foreign policy.5 Presidents utilize Executive
Branch agencies for policy implementation and to ensure that the
constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted"6 is fulfilled. However, when the President talks with big
money donors, how loudly does the echo of that conversation reso-
nate with federal agency policy-makers? 7 Should coordinated dis-
closure safeguards be used to illuminate the influence of cash con-
tributions on the output of federal agency decisions?
The largest financial supporters of a sitting President enjoy
tremendous influence. For example, the President personally
phones and meets with many of the largest donors at exclusive
events. 8 Furthermore, the Vice President does the same.9 Even
4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REGULATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 205
(1986) (noting President's constitutional right to set national policy).
5 See Perry 0. Chrisman, Confessions of a Baptist Lawyer, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1041, 1043
(1996) (referring to Truman's famous desk sign, "The buck stops here"); Douglas Harbrecht & Paula
Dwyer, What Shaped Bush's Iron Resolve in His Face-Off with Saddam, BUS. WK., Jan. 28, 1991, at 38
(describing Truman's "The Buck Stops Here" sign as billboard for his toughness); Hugh SideyJust
Wild About Harry. (Truman), TIME, Sept. 14, 1992, at 40 (discussing how past presidents have tried to
identify themselves with Truman, including Jimmy Carter).
6 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. see also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Presi-
dent's Power to Execute the Laws, 104YALE L.J. 541, 589 (1994) (affirming importance of executive's
unitary authority in executing federal law); Rossi,supra note 1, at 221-22 (explaining Constitutional
significance and practical importance of Executive's duty to ensure that laws are "faithfully executed").
7 See LARRY SABATO & GLENN SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF
CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1996) (providing useful examination of fundraising's perverse
effects on congressional elections).
8 See Joseph Lieberman, The Politics of Money and the Road to Self-Destruction, 16YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 425, 437 (1998) (demonstrating presidential fundraising under guise of White House cof-
fees); see also Richard L. Berke, White House Gives Tapes of Clinton and Rich Donors,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1997, at A6 (describing release of tapes illustrating Clinton greeting wealthy donors at 44 cof-
fees); John H. Cushman, Jr., Records Show Clinton Made White House Calls to Donors,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1997, at Al (discussing telephone records that show that President Clinton made fundraising
telephone calls from White House); Daniel Klaidman & Michael Isikoff, The Prosecutor Problem:
Clinton's Dialing for Dollars May Force Reno 's HandNEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1997, at 39 (illustrating
Clinton's fundraising efforts via phone calls).
9 See Rep. Bob Barr, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Clinton-Gore Scandals and the Ques-
tion of Impeachment, 2TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 30 (1997) (describing Gore's involvement in telephone
solicitations); see also James Barnes, Spin Becomes Backspin, NAT'L J., Sept. 6, 1997, at 28 (discuss-
ing Vice President's role in 1996 fundraising efforts at a Buddhist temple as visual icon of campaign
finance excesses of that campaign); David Johnston,Notes Raise Question on What Gore KnewN.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al (discussing Gore's role in telephone calls regarding fundraising); James S.
Robbins, The Case Against Al Gore, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at A 19 (discussing Gore admission
concerning telephone calls).
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Cabinet members tour cities and state capitals in order to get do-
nors to back the presidential agenda with capital investments. 10
Moreover, the President and his aides know that the President's
success in re-election depends on being responsive to large donors'
needs. 11 This is American political reality, as it exists today.
Senator John McCain recently criticized the Clinton Admini-
stration in a CBS broadcast interview. He observed that the cur-
rent Administration's eagerness to win re-election during the 1996
presidential campaign had resulted in mobilization of government
hand-outs in favor of donors. 12 Whether or not McCain was cor-
rect, this perception alone leaves one to wonder about the inde-
pendence of the Administrative State. For example, were the sat-
ellite technology export controls waived in favor of Loral Space &
Communications Corp., a company whose chairman was the larg-
est individual donor to the Clinton re-election?13 Did the amount
of Asian-originated contributions to the 1996 re-election effort sig-
nal an expectation that the Commerce and Defense Departments
would be more receptive to export licensure for technology? 14 Did
10 See Tim Weiner, Lake Pulls Out as C.I.A. Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1997, at AI (dis-
cussing how Lake withdrew his nomination based on concerns regarding his status as Clinton's Na-
tional Security Advisor and possible involvement in dubious fundraising schemes).
11 See Jeremy Lehrer, As McCain-Feingold Awaits Final Judgment, The Debate Continues About
the Merits and Finer Points of Campaign Finance Reform, 25HuM. RTS. 10, 12 (1998) (noting that
campaign contributions are way of investing in legislative future);see also Bill McAllister, Wisconsin
Backers of Gingrich Termed Hill's Biggest Patrons, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1998, at Al9 (discussing
how large donations to candidates can get big results in policy).
12 See CBS Sunday Morning (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 4, 1998) (statement of Sen. John
McCain).
13 See Jill Abramson & Don Van Natta, Jr., A Top Clinton Donor Says Money Didn't Buy Ap-
proval on Satellites, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1998, at 3 (describing Bernard L. Schwartz's, Chairman of
Loral, meeting with President Clinton to discuss Loral's satellite work); Ruth Marcus & John Mintz,
Big Donor Calls Favorable Treatment a Coincidence, WASH. POST, May 25, 1998, at Al (discussing
coincidence that Clinton administration has adopted favorable policies towards U.S. companies doing
business in China while Loral Chairman Bernard L. Schwartz contributed more than $1 million to
Democratic committees since Clinton has taken office); see also Brian Duffy & Bob Woodward, Sen-
ate Panel is Briefed on China Probe Figure, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at AI (describing evidence
linking Chinese government to American elections); Bob Woodward, FBI Had Overlooked Key Files in
Probe of Chinese Influence, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1997, at AI (suggesting possibility of involvement
of Chinese government in 1996 presidential election).
14 See New Lawyer Named to Lead Donor Inquiry, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1998, at A17 (describing
Justice Department investigation into whether political donations influenced President Clinton's deci-
sion to overrule State Department by granting waivers to two U.S. companies, allowing them to export
satellite technology to China); Bill Nichols et. al., Chinese Connection has Some Missing Links a Dif-
ference of Opinion Over Gravity of Waiver for Satellite Deal, USA TODAY, May 26, 1998, at A8 (dis-
cussing waiver given to Loral for satellite launch in China even though Justice Department warned
against it); see also Lieberman, supra note 8, at 456-59 (detailing instances of Asian donations fun-
neled into 1996 elections); Bruce D. Brown,Alien Donors: The Participation of Non-Citizens in the
U.S. Campaign Finance System, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 503, 505-6 (1997) (listing instances of
questionable Asian donations).
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selective and lucrative Indian Nation contributions influence the
choice made by the Interior Secretary to award a casino license to
one tribe over another?15
A. The Need for Change
Perceptions become accepted as reality faster in Washington
than anywhere else in the nation. One deeply rooted perception
is that large contributions amount to purchasing access to the
President, thereby bringing positive regulatory outcomes to
these donors. Unfortunately, the nature of the political fund-
raising process is such that empirical data is never available, for
no donor would care to disclose its rewards in public. Greater
"sunshine" disclosure about donors' campaign contributions and
what responses they produced is needed, therefore, so that the
public perception of fairness in the administrative rulemaking
process is restored. 16
A direct parallel to presidential contributions is the pragmatic
Washington belief that access and voting outcomes will be im-
pacted by the size of the contributions made to Senators or Rep-
resentatives by political action committees. 17 In Congress, the
vote is recorded, financial contributions are noted, and the press
can comment on the influence. Unlike Congress, however, the
rulemaking process in the Executive branch is murky and ad
hoc. Money can buy access to the President, but how this money
affects outcomes in the administrative agencies is not transpar-
ent.18 A change in disclosure of campaign fund flows would help
15 See Jill Abramson, Money Buys a Lot More Than Access, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at I (dis-
cussing how group of Indian tribes trying to kill rival group's casino project donated $270,000 to
Democratic Party, and soon afterwards, Interior Department rejected rival's casino project even though
it had been approved by its regional office); Ruth Marcus,GOP Hits Gore on Temple Fund-Raiser:
Senate Draft Report Accuses Democrats of Violating Campaign Laws,WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1998, at
Al (discussing allegations of impropriety in denial of casino licenses to three tribes); Robert Suro,
Reno to Omit Clinton from Casino Probe,WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1997, at A4 (focusing on issues con-
ceming denial of casino licenses to Indian tribes).
16 See Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent Advocacy in an Age of Mistrust, 95
MICH. L. REV. 1, 62-64 (1996) (discussing benefits of disclosure in administrative setting).
17 See FREDERICK SLABACH (ED.), THE CONSTITUTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: AN
ANTHOLOGY (1998); Graeme Browning, Web Surfing For Dollar-Vote Link,NAT'L J., Jan. 25, 1997, at
I (discussing how Center for Responsive Politics is reporting on Intemet how PAC contributions af-
fected voting in Congress); Tony Capaccio,Northrop Grumman 's '95 Contributions Seem Timed For
B-2 Action, DEF. WK., July 31, 1995, at I (discussing how Northrop Grumman donated lots of money
to House members right before crucial vote on B-2 spending).
18 See Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt
the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 839-40 (1998) (stating that buying access
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considerably to improve perceptions concerning the integrity of
policy decisions in the Executive branch.
B. The Challenge
This article examines and challenges the effects of presidential
fundraising upon Executive branch agencies. Furthermore, this
article proposes a system of focused disclosure as a solution to Ex-
ecutive Branch influence by presidential campaign donors. Under
this system, there would be more media commentary concerning
donations, resulting in both public and legal consequences for the
donors.19 The federal appellate courts that oversee agency policy-
making would be expected to hear claims that tighter scrutiny of
the "tainted" agency decision is necessary. 20 Advocates armed
with facts about donor influence will be able to assert that defer-
ence should not be accorded to certain administrative agency pol-
icy outcomes, especially where rulemaking and permit decisions
have been "sold" to donors by the President's political aides.
Furthermore, the forced disclosure system would shed light into
the administrative agencies that act by processes that are less
than fully transparent, such as rulemaking. Even though, in no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking, 21 all commentators are ostensibly
equal, political contributors who have the personal attention of the
President's staff are perhaps more equal than others.
II. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
A. Questioning Deference
Federal appellate courts need to reexamine the deference ac-
corded to political choices made in major rulemaking proceedings.
through contributions has become commonplace in politics); Donald J. SimonBeyond Post-Watergate
Reform: Putting an End to the Soft Money System, 24J. LEGIS. 167, 174 (1998) (citing examples of
public bartering for access).
19 See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulating Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 186-91 (1990) (discussing disclosure);
Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46ADMIN. L. REV.
1, 21 (1994) (arguing advantages of disclosure).
20 See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Fed-
eral Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984, 1027 (1990) (stating Appellate Courts' close scrutiny of
Agency decisions is legitimate, constitutional part of our system).
21 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1996) (setting forth notice requirements for proposed rulemaking activi-
ties).
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Moreover, the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") should
revisit its decision in Sierra Club v. Costle.22 In this case, the D.C.
Circuit encouraged agency managers to act with "openness, acces-
sibility and amenability... to the needs and ideas of the public
from which their ultimate authority derives, and upon whom their
commands must fall."2 3 This noble ideal, unfortunately, has been
tainted and manipulated by excessive responsiveness to political
campaign donors. 24
However, since it is the courts that can invalidate agencies'
rules, it is the courts that can keep agencies "honest" about the
motivation underlying their rules. 25 If donors "capture" and kill an
agency rulemaking project, judicial review could determine
whether donor influence led to the policy choice. If the contribu-
tions-for-access system becomes more transparent, courts could
apply a harsher scrutiny of agencies' rationales, especially where
factual assertions of political donor influence are presented in
challenges to an agency rule or policy. Ultimately, the courts will
need to re-evaluate the impact of the creeping phenomenon of
campaign fundraising on officials promising more responsive or
friendlier administrative decisions towards those who gave large
campaign contributions.
B. Providing Data for Appellate Courts
Appellate courts need data in order to effectively respond to
claims of improper donor influence. 26 To provide this data, exist-
22 657 F.2d 298, 406-408 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (pointing out complexities of agency decisions and in-
dicating courts should be cautious in their review).
23 Id. at 400-01.
24 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias In
Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons From Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481,
481-82 (1990). Courts have identified three occasions of "impermissible agency bias":
(1) Decisionmaker cannot have a direct and significant financial interest in the out-
come of an adjudicatory dispute;
(2) Decisionmaker cannot have a friendship with or animosity toward a party to an
adjudicatory dispute, if that friendship or animosity has an unofficial origin;
(3) Decisionmaker cannot prejudge contested adjudicative facts, if that prejudgment
has an unofficial source."
Id.
25 See Peter M. Schenkkan, When and How Should Texas Courts Review Agency Rules?, 47
BAYLOR L. REV. 989, 1071-72 (1995) (stating Federal courts will remand agency policy decisions
when explanations are inadequate); seealso SEC v. Cheney Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (stating Fed-
eral courts do not replace agency decisions with their own, but instead review and remand).
26 See McGarity, supra note 2, at 460-61 (stating that in order for judicial review to be effective,
courts must review agencies' information and reasons); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,The APA and Regulatory
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ing information need only be marshaled into a standard reporting
format within the agencies. This can be done voluntarily by an
agency or by a Presidential Executive Order which directs the
agencies to routinely disclose the data revealing financial influ-
ence. 27 However, such a presidential order is counter-intuitive for
his advisors to recommend. Therefore, a statutory form of sun-
shine disclosure setting forth the key data elements of the connec-
tion between executive branch decisions and the systems of presi-
dential fundraising is needed.
The strong perception of undue donor influence upon adminis-
trative policy outcomes in the administrative state is a valid con-
cern.28 Presently, once data supporting a final agency rule is as-
sembled by the agency in the administrative record, the courts do
not wish to probe further. If disclosure of major donor impacts on
major rules were accessible, advocates could urge courts to exam-
ine whether the executive branch discretion was tainted, not by
valid constituency representation, but by donor pressure. Schol-
ars of Congress have already examined the negative effect of
elected representatives serving their donors, and not their broader
constituency. 29 Disclosure backed by appellate court scrutiny of
discretionary choices will deter inappropriate action.30 Reaching
this goal, with only minimal paperwork burdens for the agencies,
is the challenge this article confronts.
Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 81, 83 (1996) (indicating courts review agency data).
27 See McGarity, supra note 2, at 443-44 (indicating presidents exert control over agency decision
making process through Executive orders); see also Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193
(1981) (providing for presidential oversight of agency decision making process and increasing account-
ability for agencies); Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of
Constitutional Issues that may be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23ARiz. L. REV. 1199, 1200
(1981) (indicating Exec. Order 12,291 will provide presidential oversight of agency rulemaking deci-
sions).
28 See 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (1996) (setting forth authorized political activities that government em-
ployees may participate in); see also Seth D. Zinman,Judging Gift Rules By Their Wrappings-Towards
a Clearer Articulation of Federal Employee Gift-Acceptance Rules, 44CATH. U.L. REV. 141, 198
(1994) (stating rules are provided to prevent appearance of improper donor influence).
29 See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fundraising, Why Campaign Spend-
ing Limits may not Violate the First Amendment After all, 94COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1282-83 (1994)
(stating constituent representation suffers when legislators are more concerned with fundraising for re-
election then with legislative business).
30 See 5 U.S.C.S. § 706 (1996) (providing for judicial review of agency decisions to reduce inap-
propriate actions); Hughes Air Corp. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 482 F.2d 143, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1973)
(holding courts can set aside agency decision courts believe to be arbitrary or abuse of discretion).
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III. THE STATE OF THE CURRENT LAW
A. Status of the President
Federal administrative law presumes that the executive branch
agencies will receive policy direction from the President, with a
minimum of both procedural constraints and judicial oversight. 31
In other words, the President has great discretion. 32 The individ-
ual presidential decisions of whether to adopt policy choices are
not made within the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking
process. 33 The writings and records of the President are not sus-
ceptible to Freedom of Information Act requests.34 Actions com-
mitted to presidential discretion by statute are not judicially re-
viewable. 35 Furthermore, courts will not probe the mind of the
Executive Branch decision-maker to allow depositions on possible
political motivations. 36
Therefore, the courts have generally deferred to the choices
made by the President, especially where the President affirms an
agency policy choice that was made under a statute that is am-
biguous. 37 The courts show disinterest in how agencies choose
31 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (providing presidential oversight of
agency decision making); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Bal-
ances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48ARK. L. REV. 161, 193-95 (1994) (describ-
ing that independent agencies are susceptible to presidential influence because presidents choose
agency heads, and that agencies still need presidential support for legislative initiatives and involve-
ment in budget process).
32 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 417 (1998) (holding judicial review of presi-
dential decisions is less appropriate than review of agency decisions); Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462,
475 (1994) (holding Presidential discretion provided by Congress is not subject to judicial review).
33 See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992) (holding President is not "agency", so
his actions are not reviewable under Administrative Procedure Act scope of review of "agency").
34 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(0(1) (1996). This statute covers the Executive Office of the President but
not the President and his immediate advisers. ld.; Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (indicating President has authority to destroy Presidential records);see also Meyer v. Bush, 981
F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that Vice President and immediate advisors of President are
also exempt from FOIA access requests).
35 See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(2) (1998) (providing that agency action is not subject to review)Dalton,
511 U.S. at 473-74 (holding that claims that President has exceeded his statutory authority are not sub-
ject to judicial review, only "constitutional" claims are reviewable); Nat'l Council for Ind. Defense,
Inc. v. United States, 827 F.Supp. 794, 798-99 (D.D.C. 1993) (stating that court does not have jurisdic-
tion over claims asserted against President).
36 See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (stating lower court should never have
reviewed Cabinet officer reasoning).
37 See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (stat-
ing that if statute is ambiguous, court will uphold agency decision even if different from decision court
would have reached); see also Cynthia R Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 462-63 (1989) (describingChevron an stating "the
judiciary's role in interpreting regulatory statutes amounts to little more than serving as a mouthpiece
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policy winners and losers so long as the record is supported by
evidence that the agency has made a reasonable interpretation of
its ambiguous statute.38 Such conduct by the courts contrasts
with reports about the very hands-on attention that larger donors
appear to receive from the White House political staff and the pos-
sible effects that donations can have on policy decisions. 39
The reform discussed in this article would impact the current
presumptions routinely applied by the courts. If a Political Trans-
parency Report were attached to the final rule, courts would be
able to respond with less deference in cases where the donors' in-
fluence on policy appears overreaching. However, judicial reversal
of the agency choice would still be unlikely, unless the court is
persuaded that political funding swayed the agency beyond the
norms of reasoned administrative decision-making.
B. Tying Disclosure to Contributions
The Federal Election Campaign Act links the timing of manda-
tory disclosure of donors to specific dates during the campaign
cycle. 40 Reports are routinely made of large cash flows into the
presidential reelection campaigns. 4 1 Today, fundraising by the
President and Vice President has become a virtually full time ac-
tivity. For example, on two occasions in 1998, a President who
cannot run for reelection flew to Cincinnati for no other purpose
than a fundraising meal with wealthy donors at the home of the
city's most successful plaintiffs tort lawyer.42
for legislative directives that are unequivocal and directly on point. Whenever such a communication
cannot be conveyed, the court must step aside to free the agency... to resolve what its statute shall
mean"); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 136 (1994) (stating that courts have given agencies due deference when it comes to readings if
statutory meaning because of agencies closeness to legislative process and continued involvement and
responsibility of enforcement).
38 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (indicating courts should
avoid inquiry into mental process of decision makers in agencies).
39 See Berke, supra note 8, at A6 (describing private world of White House gatherings where
wealthy donors mingle with President Clinton); John M. BroderOn Tape: Clinton and Yesterday's Old
Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at A4 (describing attendance of wealthy donors at variety of
events such as intimate meals in White House Blue Room and meeting President Clinton in Oval Of-
fice); Marcus & Mintz, supra note 13, at AI (discussing how large donor was twice invited to stay in
Lincoln bedroom and attended state dinners with foreign heads of state).
40 See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1985) (setting forth filing requirements for receipts and disbursements by
treasurers of political committees).
41 See 11 C.F.R. § 104.5(b) (1998) (setting forth requirements for filing reports depending on
amount of political contributions for year).
42 See R.W. Apple, Jr., Testing of a President: Tepid Welcome; In Cincinnati. the President
Makes a Most Abnormal Visit, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1998, at A22 (discussing Clinton's attendance at
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However, what happens with the requests of those who buy
such access? The donors frequently want to influence post-
election choices, rather than merely favoring one candidate's
electoral victory.43 One who has achieved the Presidency must go
back "on the road" soon after Inauguration to greet donors who
want to discuss their policy views and how the Administration
will accommodate these views.
C. Avoiding the First Amendment Minefield
Disclosure in electoral contexts is circumscribed by the rights
of donors. 44 First Amendment protected speech includes the
right to participate in political campaign support.45 Donors are
welcomed and encouraged to participate because advertising is
expensive and the public has shown no willingness to fund cam-
paigns with tax money. Furthermore, being identified as a donor
is not dishonorable or suspect, and in some instances, disclosure
of donors already takes place.
The Federal Election Act provides that the identities of the
employers of individuals who make donations be made public.46
The identities of soft money sources are also generally known by
the national political parties, 47 whether or not these sources "co-
fund-raising luncheon at home of trial lawyer Stanley M. Chelsey); Katherine Q. Seelye, Clinton Makes
Plea for Congress to Use Its (Short) Time Wisely, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1998, at A16 (describing that
President Clinton traveled to trial lawyer Stanley M. Chelsley's home in Cincinnati for fund-raising sit-
down dinner where tickets cost minimum of $10,000 per person and $15,000 per corporation).
43 See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply
Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 313 (1989) (stating that "[a] considerable amount of the money that
goes to candidates from economic-group contributors is motivated by a desire to influence the perform-
ance of officeholders rather than to influence who is elected"). But see FRANK J. SORAUF, MONEY IN
AMERICAN ELECTIONS 310 (1988) (arguing that donations to campaigns are made based upon desire to
further careers of those predisposed to support their views).
44 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976) (discussing that
donor's have right to petition government by donating money).
45 See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 604
(1996) (concluding that First Amendment prohibits application of Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 to expenditures that political parties make independently without candidate coordination); Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (holding that there is fundamental constitutional difference between
advertising one's views independently of candidate's campaign and direct contributions to that cam-
paign); see also FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498-99 (1985)
(holding that Buckley applies to advertisements made by Political Action Committees (PACs) as well).
46 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. (1985). This section provides for FEC authority over campaign
funding disclosure. Id.
47 See Center for Responsive Politics, Top Soft Money Donors, 1997-1998 (visited Jan. 17, 1999)
<http://www.crp.org>. The top five soft money donors to the Republican Party are: Philip Morris
$1,487,022; Amway Corp. $1,312,500; RJR Nabisco $568,850; AT & T $564,503; and Blue Cross/Blue
Shield $562,575. Id. The top five soft money donors to the Democratic Party are: Buttenweiser & As-
soc. $570,000; Communications Workers of America $561,250; Loral Spacecom $526,000; SlimFast
MONEY TALKS AND POLICY WALKS
ordinate" election spending with the presidential candidate.
However, full disclosure concerning soft money donors is a topic
beyond the scope of this article.
Freedom of association would be chilled if the government
could force every private group to register its lists of members. 48
Rather than compelling private persons to disclose their motives
for contributing, or attempting an unwise ban on contributions
by regulated persons, the donor transparency proposed in this
article would instead balance disclosure of donors with First
Amendment rights. The donor transparency would require
clerks in a federal agency to collate two sets of public facts that
are already known in separate corners of the federal bureauc-
racy: (1) companies that are likely to be affected by the rule or
policy; and (2) companies whose employees paid for political
campaign or party activities. This information is readily avail-
able and can be downloaded from the FEC data bases on a peri-
odic basis.
IV. THE DONOR TRANSPARENCY PROPOSAL
A. Summary of the Proposal
This article recommends implementing a system of disclosure
comprised of three tiers of information. The disclosure would
consist of a list of those entities which: (1) employ individuals
who contributed to the overall presidential effort; (2) would bene-
fit from the declaration of a new agency rule, license or policy (or
the formal withdrawal or revocation of a proposed or final rule);
and (3) where the rule's fiscal impact classifies it as a "major"
rule or action. When an agency acts, disclosure of donations by
entities impacted by the new rules would either be a component
of the published rule, or in readily accessible agency documents
on the agency Internet website. 49 The task of having a govern-
Foods/Thompson Medical $410,000; and Williams & Bailey $410,000. Id.
48 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that compelled disclosure of mem-
bership lists abridged members right of lawful association); see also Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
523 (1960) (holding that refusal to disclose membership lists in order to protect freedom of association
of members was protected by Due Process Clause).
See JAMES T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 7.03 (1983). The preamble is an explana-
tion of the basis for the agency's proposed or final rule, but is not itself a part of the codified final rule.
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ment agency correlate major actions with incoming presidential
political contributions requires no invasion of donor privacy,
since the contributors have no legitimate expectation of privacy
under election statutes. 50
Congress should adopt a "Politically Transparent Rulemaking"
amendment to section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act.5 1
This amendment would compel the addition of an additional rec-
ord to the agency's file prepared by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"), which would match contributors and
persons impacted by the rule.52 The record would examine the
contributions received by the presidential election campaign, and
by national parties and their "soft money" affiliated accounts. 53
A reportable data point would arise whenever the individual
donors' employers, identified in the party or committee Federal
Election Commission ("FEC") filings, are likely beneficiaries of a
final administrative rulemaking, license issuance or
waiver/exception decision. The agency would provide the list
from which the matching is drawn, identifying the entities that
are expected to be most financially impacted by the new
agency rule.
B. Role of OIRA
The OIRA, which is within the Office of Management and
Budget, is the official gatekeeper of new executive branch
rules.54 OIRA reviews the substance of rules as required under
Executive Order 12,866. 55 It considers "major" rules with special
care.
56
OIRA is the highest level within the federal bureaucracy
through which most executive branch rulemaking and policy
50 See Disclosure of Federal Campaign Funds, 2 U.S.C. §§ 43 let seq. (1985) (detailing disclosure
process of campaign contributions).
51 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1996).
52 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1996). This Act provides that a general notice of proposed rule
making shall be published in the Federal Register. Id.
53 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976). "Soft money" is the independent expenditure of
funds sanctioned by this decision. Id.
54 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 C.F.R. 51,735 (1993) (granting Office of Management and
Budget authority to review all regulatory analysis documents in order to determine whether they com-
ply with executive order requirements).
55 See id. (centralizing review of regulations in OIRA "to enhance planning and coordination with
respect to both new and existing regulations").
56 See id. (requiring cost-benefit analysis of "major" agency regulations).
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pronouncements pass.57 It is there where Federal Election
Commission donor reports and agency registrant or licensee lists
can most readily be matched. Any alternative would be less effi-
cient.
C. Role of the Federal Election Commission
The political funding progress by the presidential campaign
committee and of the party central committee is directly super-
vised on a daily basis by the closest advisors to the presidential
candidate. Moreover, FEC donor reports are routinely submitted
by accountants for the political committees. 58
If such a Political Transparency Report amendment were
adopted, the OIRA could routinely receive FEC input tapes for
each reporting period, and could (if such a statutory command
with necessary appropriation funds were enacted) routinely ob-
tain the printouts of re-election committee lists of campaign do-
nations received of $1,000 or more. 59 The amendment could also
require that the central committee finance department of the
political party must provide to the FEC and to the OIRA, lists of
organizations and their individual employees who have given a
party or its subsidiary entities gifts of $1,000 or more within the
year preceding the amendment's effective date. The reports
would be filed for each party fielding a presidential candidate
and, for a sitting president who is not a candidate for reelection,
by the party for which the sitting president is a member.
D. The Agency Responsibility
The OIRA would obtain from each Executive branch agency,
when it sends forward a "major" rule or policy statement, a list of
the twenty-five largest entities that are most likely to be finan-
57 See id.
58 See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1985) (setting forth filing requirements for "[r]eceipts and disbursements
by treasurers of political committee").
59 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1985). Corporate gifts to candidates are not permitted. This
sections provides in relevant part:
It is unlawful for any bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of
Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political of-
fice...
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cially impacted by the new rule. 60 The agency would provide the
list based on its existing awareness of the regulated community.
The OIRA would then match the two lists of entities and provide
a copy of the Political Transparency Report to the rulemaking
agency. The agency would then attach this to the published pre-
amble to the rule or policy.
E. Terms of the Proposed Amendment
Statutory amendment of the rulemaking provisions of the fed-
eral Administrative Procedure Act would require inclusion of
only one new document into the administrative record. This
"Political Transparency Report" would be required when the rule
or policy statement is to be published in the Federal Register in
proposed and in final form, but only if the rule is "major" in im-
pact. Agencies and the OIRA have for the last two decades cate-
gorized certain rules as "major" depending on their cost im-
pacts. 61 For published decisions that are not rules, such as policy
determinations and permits issued without adjudicatory hear-
ings, a similar size or impact threshold would be applied in the
statutory definitions in this amendment.
The report would accompany the proposed or final major rule
or policy statement from the OIRA to the agency and to the
rulemaking record. In addition, the report would be cited among
the supporting documents listed in the Federal Register as being
available from the agency's reading room or docket clerk, or
published in the Federal Register, and/or made accessible at the
agency website. The report would be a list of: (1) any contribu-
tion over $1,000; (2) made within 18 months' time, prior to the
rule's proposal, final promulgation, or withdrawal; (3) made to a
presidential campaign or re-election committee, a national politi-
cal party of which the President is a member, or an affiliated or
subsidiary committee; (4) by an entity or individual whose FEC
donor disclosure identifies ownership or employment by an en-
60 Selection of a set of 25 entities is suggested for administrative efficiency; if there are many en-
tities affected, a selectivity based on entity size appears rational, where the entities most likely to make
donations are those most likely to be impacted financially.
61 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993). "Major" means the rule will have an
impact on the national economy of $100 million or more, or will otherwise be classed as having major
impacts. Id.; see also Peter A. Pfohl, Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking: The 104th Con-
gress and the Salvage Timber Directive, 14 J. L. & POL. 1, 6 (1998) (discussing definition of term
"major").
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tity that is among the twenty-five entities known to the agency
to have the largest impacts from adoption of the rule or policy.
The legislation would clarify coverage to reach the larger, im-
pactful contributions (proposed to be $1,000) that would trigger
inclusion of the donor's identity in the report. To the extent that
current FEC laws do not require, the new law would require the
contributor identity reports to be prepared by the presidential
campaign and by the political party of which the President is a
member, 62 sorted by employer or similar entity. Next, the FEC
would be authorized funding in order to allow timely delivery of
the necessary matching lists to the OIRA. The amendment
would then require that the matching lists be made available by
the OIRA and the agency.
Eighteen months is a fair window of time for reporting of the
potential influences, in recognition that a lag time exists be-
tween cash changing hands and major rules appearing (or disap-
pearing) within the Executive branch. Ideally, the time span
would be shorter between directive and action, but pragmati-
cally, the time span of a year and a half is a fair estimate of the
useful impact of a contributor's single contribution. 63 Gratitude
in the form of responsiveness depreciates rapidly in the fast-
paced political fundraising climate today.
F. What Action Should be Covered?
It is important that the proposed rule and advance notice of
proposed rulemaking stages, as well as the "policy guideline" and
"statement of agency policy," be included in the legislative cover-
age. The latter two are pragmatic evasions of rulemaking, so it is
necessary to report their influence aspects. As long as there is
enough concrete agency action to have a docket or record estab-
lished for the particular action, the political transparency report
makes for greater accountability.
62 This concept presumes that only the party which the president leads would be affected by do-
nations seeking to influence presidential and agency policies. If the Administration changes party con-
trol at an election, the use of the suggested 18 months' window period will capture donors who donated
to the non-incumbent's campaign because of hope of a change in the top of the executive branch.
63 See Julie Fustanio, Klug PAC Gifts Top Slogin 3-1, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 28, 1996, at IA (discussing
that FEC looks at period of eighteen months when reviewing contributions in election cycle).
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G. An Illustrative Example
To select an illustration, assume that a proposed Federal Avia-
tion Administration rule would adversely affect costs of aviation
fuel to airlines. The OIRA review of the proposed FAA rule
would look at costs to airlines and benefits in economic terms. 64
The political transparency objective would be fostered if the
public - particularly news media and public interest organiza-
tions - would also readily observe the quantity of airline execu-
tives among the top 25 regulated air carriers licensed by the FAA
who donated to the presidential re-election committee during the
FAA rulemaking period.
The existence of such contributions is no stunning revelation,
since it is already assumed money begets influence over policy.
In some cases, the sunshine effect may yield no news, showing
the irrelevance of the contributors' efforts as to rules. However,
the airlines' million dollar re-election contributions in our hypo-
thetical case might mean the rule is withdrawn or dies inside the
agency. That connection is for the media and appellate advo-
cates to assert; the Political Transparency Report is neither sta-
tistical, narrative, nor judgmental.
H. Freedom of Information Act
Traditional administrative law does not permit one to look be-
hind the rule to find what actually motivated the agency's deci-
sion. 65 The actual documentation of why a rule or license was ac-
celerated or aborted is generally not available to the public,
unless the agency waives its right to protect pre-decisional
memoranda privilege under the Freedom of Information Act ex-
emption covering such internal memoranda. 66 The agency staff
that astutely wishes to defend itself against the press inquiry
about donor influence may opt, however, to disclose internal
memoranda showing that the White House followed campaign
donations and pressured the agency in acting a particular way
64 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993);see also Harold H. Bruff, Presidential
Management ofAgency Rulemaking, 57GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 561 (1989) (illustrating cost benefit
analysis of OIRA).
65 See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1941) (concluding that agency head acted
within his discretion in this particular case).
66 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1996) (providing that inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda and
letters are not within ambit of Freedom of Information Act).
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on the new rule. This will occur either as a leak ("don't blame
this decision on my Branch, blame it on the White House staff')
or as a dissemination of internal memos when the agency is re-
sponding to a public access request. 67
I. The Agency Burden
Agency managers already are well aware of who is regulated.
Therefore, requiring a listing of the twenty-five most impacted
entities would not be burdensome. The individuals atop the
regulated companies are recognizable faces at gatherings, such
as fund-raisers, where the Agency Director or Cabinet Secretary
is likely to be present. Even though politics does not directly
reach every decision that career employees make, there are poli-
cies that affect the granting of exceptions, permits, licenses and
registrations which flow through an agency from the highest
level on down, where donor influence can be at its greatest.
However, the extent of higher level influence is not at all appar-
ent. For example, new drug approvals, airline traffic streams,
and electric power generation permission, are the daily output of
the administrative agency staff,68 yet these policy directives are
usually initiated by the high level persons in the agency.
Executives assigned by companies to interact with the agen-
cies are familiar faces at the executive level of each agency. A
competent Secretary or Director is aware of which companies
will be affected by the adoption of a particular rule. In the staff
briefings that precede the proposed rule's drafting, managers
understand that regulations create winners and losers.
J. Impacts on the OIRA Process
Within the Office of Management and Budget, the OIRA al-
ready has responsibilities that would make undertaking any ad-
ditional tasks seem quite reasonable. The OIRA is set up to do
review of rules and to disclose certain contacts. 69 Even though
67 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (1996). Such a request would be responded to with waiver of the op-
tional power to claim exempt status under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), which provides that interoffice memo-
randa are not part of the Freedom of Information Act. Id.
68 See Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Law In the Teaching of Administrative Law: Actual Analysis of
the Status Quo, 61 TEX. L. REv. 95, 126 (1982) (stating that Federal agencies are staffed with full time
employees dedicated to function of that agency).
69 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) (providing for oversight of government
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the cross-comparison of data to produce the political transpar-
ency report might add some paperwork tracking problems for
OIRA, the task will not go unnoticed as the press is an eager
customer. After the first five or ten news stories are published
about donor influences on rulemaking, this process would gener-
ate much greater accountability for the impacts of contributions
on the perceived fairness of the agency policymaking system. In
turn, agencies and the White House will be more attentive to
getting their reports as correct as possible.
The OIRA-created listing would be a mechanical comparison of
the publicly available contribution data with the agency-created
list of affected persons and entities. The agency would then at-
tach the list to its rulemaking record along with the other man-
datory statements and analyses. Once published, the report
should be public in additional ways. For example, the "Political
Transparency Reports" should accompany each major rule on the
agency Internet website, so that an even greater dissemination
would be assured.
K Tying in the Political Contacts
Legislation or an executive order should simultaneously re-
quire that all political appointees within the Executive branch
agencies keep logs of their contacts with the White House staff,
and submit them to the agency's docket clerk for inclusion in the
final agency rulemaking record. This builds on Executive Order
12,866 disclosure of OMB and OIRA comments to an agency. 70
Broader knowledge of the correlation between Executive
branch decisions and presidential fund-raising will have a bene-
ficial "sunshine" effect, but disclosure will not eliminate pressure
from the White House on the agencies' politically appointed
managers. There is virtually no Cabinet officer or agency head
who can remain clueless about the political influence that shapes
the agency decision. Indeed, one who reaches Cabinet level is
presumptively not clueless about politics. The proposal recog-
nizes this reality. If anyone is inhibited by disclosure, it is the
political staff of the White House, and inhibition at this stage is
agencies).
70 See Seidenfeld, supra note 3, at 45 (describing OIRA's role pursuant to Exec.Order No.
12,866).
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not all that bad.
The end result of disclosure of money and contacts should gar-
ner greater news media questioning of the content of agency de-
cisions, with a concomitant awareness that the political dimen-
sion exists in agency decision-making. 71 As a side effect of the
proposal, new disclosure would give advocacy groups that study
corporate behavior on controversial government issues the in-
formation they need so that shareholder proxy proposals can be
used to oppose the corporate patterns of donations. 72
L. A Pilot Test
If Congress is reluctant to impose the new system, a pilot test
of such a disclosure system could be run in an executive depart-
ment or agency under agreement with the FEC. Such a test
could be run as an experiment on six months' worth of "major"
rules only, adopting the existing norms of classification that tie
major rule safeguards to a high dollar impact of the rule. 73 Once
experience is gained with the pilot test, Congress could adopt the
amendment to the law to require the entire executive branch to
follow this same step in adopting rules or policy statements.
Longer term, the same disclosure approach could appropri-
ately be considered for competitive licensing choices (casinos,
broadcast frequencies, etc.). These very competitive licensing
disputes that represent influence of the White House may be as
much of an issue as are final agency rules and policies; these will
be left for future remedy development. 74 Classes of non-'major"
rules could also be impacted. Non-executive branch agencies like
the National Labor Relations Board are not covered since the
presidential command influence is so attenuated for these agen-
71 See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise Performance of Negotiated Rulemak-
ing, 46 DuKE L.J. 1255, 1261 (1997) (stating that Executives have always allowed affected parties of
legislation to be included in rule making process).
72 See Jayne E. Zanglein, Pensions, Proxies and Power: Recent Developments in the Use of Proxy
Voting to Influence Corporate Governance, 7LAB. LAW. 771, 793 (1991) (discussing that SEC permits
shareholder proposals that involve political or human rights issues);see also Amalgamated Clothing &
Textile Workers v. Wal-Mart Stores, 54 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that Wal-Mart had to include
shareholder proposal concerning equal employment opportunity and affirmative action policies in its
proxy materials).
73 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
74 See Craig Crawford, Detain Me, Please, NAT'L J., June 21, 1997, at 7. The 1996 Democratic
presidential fundraising efforts led to allegations that the fundraising agents had been "trying to trade
money for Clinton Administration favors." Id.
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cies, which customarily prefer to use adjudication of fact-specific
cases.
V. THE OBJECTIONS
A. Is The Disclosure Pejorative Or Chilling?
This disclosure is not a criticism of the donor. If the rule-
making record at the agency contains such a listing, it is not pe-
jorative or punitive. Corporations are already known to be active
in politics, subject to a number of constitutionally permissible
constraints. 75 The disclosure is not a revelation of donors'
wrongdoing. Nor does the listing cause agencies to feel more
pressure. Lastly, since this ministerial function of matching lists
is done by clerks, it is unlikely that the existence of the match
will be a self-fulfilling prophecy, i.e. that the agency head will
feel any more pressured by the donors via the White House po-
litical staff than is presently the case.
B. Sunshine Has Additional Costs
Costs of the proposed system are one additional objection. At
the agency, data bases may need to be augmented to compile the
twenty-five highest impact entities. The sunshine disclosure of
the financial contributors would not be a significant new ex-
pense, since the Federal Election Commission already makes
public their names, affiliated institution or employer, date and
amount of contribution. 76 The FEC delivers to OIRA a listing
that sorts contributor rosters by donor's employer, at the cost of
a manipulation of the FEC's existing software.
C. Risk of Errors
Functionally, creation of lists by the OIRA from the FEC data
base of reports is a clerical task, while agency creation of the list
75 See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990) (stating that lim-
iting independent corporate expenditures is justified because of corporate structure which allows access
to large amounts of funds); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (stating that corporate
speech can be limited where state can show compelling subordinate interest).
76 See 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1985) (imposing disclosure requirements on organizations and individuals
contributing to campaigns); Federal Election Commission Panel Discussion, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
223, 237 (1994) (discussing agencies involved in disclosure process).
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of affected persons is a staff person's responsibility. An agency's
outreach office, business liaison staff or similar entity could
manage the mechanical function of compiling these listings, be-
ginning with the identity of those who had commented on the
topic, and the list of companies registered for that particular
product line. The creation of such a report involves no imposi-
tion on the private sector, no added private paperwork burden,
and no libelous or negative conclusion as to the listed donors.
The report is not a criticism or indictment of the donor; it is a
starting point for inquiry and is not a clue to some "whodunit"
mystery. For example, Merck makes pharmaceuticals; if its
CEO makes political donations to presidential campaigns, the
Merck name is in the FEC database. Assume that the F DA
proposes new rules, having "major" significant economic impact,
on its criteria for approval of new pharmaceutical products.
Merck would be named on the FEC lists as well as on the FDA
lists of the twenty-five largest pharmaceutical companies. When
the final FDA rule's Political Transparency Report lists the con-
tributions to presidential reelection fund-raisers by twenty
Merck managers, the listings signal to news media observers
that further questions to FDA and Merck may be appropriate.
To assuage any concern that errors in the matching could cast
corporations in an unfavorable light, the legislation might op-
tionally provide for advance notice of the inclusion of a company
onto the agency's twenty-five impacted entities list. This step
has costs and involves agency counsel in dealing with objectors,
but listing alone has no negative inference, so the possible option
of notification is unlikely to add a level of unneeded additional
costs.
D. Costs to the Donor
The proposed legislation requires no action by donors. Some
will wish to know that their identity was being disseminated
along with the text of a new rule. If the contributor merely coin-
cidentally had earned a favorable agency decision in a rulemak-
ing, license or exception case, the public attention to the linkage
of benefit and donation could be assuaged by giving that donor
entity five days advance notice prior to disclosure. This would
allow the company or organization to know that its connection to
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the rule would be subject to possible media scrutiny. Some no-
tice might be provided in order to allow the entity to disavow the
employee-contributor's donations, where denial can credibly be
asserted. Disclosure will not chill opposition to the agency since
the donor identity already is available in public FEC files.
E. Pandering to Curiosity
One argument against this change might be that it is a form of
voyeurism, peering into the suspect linkages of money and power
as if there is something wrong with a presidential decision to be
"responsive and helpful" to friendly donors. 77 One could allege
that disclosure impairs the constitutional right to petition the
government. 78 That concern presupposes that administrative
agencies want to act in secret. Rather, these agencies should be
as open as the Administrative Procedure Act requires them to
be. 79 Petitioning in public is commonplace; secret special plead-
ing runs contrary to the norms of sound administrative behavior.
This claim of corporate privacy sounds very much like the dis-
may expressed by critics of the Freedom of Information Act,80
who scorned that law's pro-disclosure motives in the early
1960s. 8 1
As an example, cigarette regulation is controversial for regula-
tory agencies. Perhaps there is no reason to believe that tobacco
77 See United States v. Dazier, 672 F.2d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that courts do not "seek
to punish every elected official who solicits a monetary contribution that represents the donor's vague
expectation of future benefits"). But see United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(stating that "[n]o politician who knows the identity and business interests of his campaign contributors
is ever completely devoid of knowledge as to the inspiration behind the donation").
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. This amendment reads in full:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-
dress of grievances.
Id.
79 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1996) (providing that agency during rulemaking process shall "give inter-
ested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation").
80 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1996) (providing that any person can request agency record and that agency
must disclose it unless it falls into exemption set forth in statute).
81 See, e.g., Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public's Right to Know: The "Cen-
tral Purpose " of the Freedom of Information Act, 46ADMIN. L. REv. 41, 43-44 (1994) (discussing that
businesses feared that Freedom of Information Act could be used by competitor to gather information
that could be used to gain commercial advantage); Patricia M. Wald,The Freedom of Information Act:
A Short Case Study In the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33EMORY L.J. 649,
650-56 (1984).
[Vol. 14:51
MONEY TALKS AND POLICY WALKS
executives' political donations had any influence at all on federal
policies about tobacco regulation prior to 1996, when FDA
adopted its first rulemaking on cigarettes. 82 However, full dis-
closure would aid the public in studying why there was no action
taken for so many years.
F. Benefits of Policy Oversight
An additional criticism may be that any inhibition in White
House political involvement with policy lessens presidential
oversight of the agencies. 83 Unsupervised managers could then
choose bad policy that is misaligned with the nation's needs.
The President must be able to impose intra-Administration dis-
cipline. Advocates of closer central control on formation of policy
would disfavor the implied pressure against White House con-
tacts with agencies.
One response is that serious presidential intervention to over-
ride career agency rulemaking projects is rare,8 4 but White
House staff contacts seem to be a constant route of donor input.
This is sound principle, as thoughtful policy development at the
White House needs dialogue with the agency planners and
implementers. To the extent that White House political staff
provide a form of selective "constituent service" to large cash do-
nors, these staff contacts are not beneficial to the alignment of
policy with democratic constituencies - they only seek to align
the federal rule or permit or policy with a private entity's objec-
82 See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398 (1996) (setting forth regulations that
prohibit sale of tobacco products to persons under age of 18); Analysis Regarding the Food and Drug
Administration's Jurisdiction Over Nicotine-Containing Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products,
60 Fed. Reg. 41,453 (1995) (setting forth FDA jurisdiction over cigarettes and declaring that nicotine is
drug that can be regulated); see also Jon. D. Hanson, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for
Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1171-74 (1998) (discussing how FDA in
1995, after nearly fifty years of inaction, finally decided to assert jurisdiction over tobacco products);
David A. Rienzo, About-Face: How FDA Changed its Mind, Took on the Tobacco Companies in Their
own Back Yard, and Won, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 243, 244-51 (1998) (discussing history of FDA regu-
lation of tobacco related products).
83 See Federal Election Commission Panel Discussion,supra note 76, at 241 (observing that there
will always be executive involvement in administrative agencies because of executive appointment of
commissioners).
84 See e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that regardless of
Presidential involvement, any administrative rule must be supported by rulemaking record); Angel
Manuel Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory Process, 8ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 461,499 (1994) (discussing extent of presidential involvement in agencies).
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tive. 85 Contributors with a one-topic agenda should be publicly
identified, but the quality of true substantive policy oversight by
the President will not decrease. 86
G. Adding to Ossification?
Another critique is that each rule that traverses the rulemak-
ing process already has to carry so much qualitative study, such
as those of benefits and costs, 87 that rules get "ossified"8 8 , so
burdened in red tape that they never emerge from the rulemak-
ing process. This argument posits that adding another paper-
work burden would waste time and deter useful rules as well as
disclose the influences that led to weaker or withdrawn rules.
However, this circumstance is different because there is no
narrative analysis written: OIRA's quantitative match of two
lists produces a Political Transparency Report. Only rules of
major impact are affected. No time-consuming analytical docu-
ment is generated. The listing speaks for itself and its signifi-
cance can be denied (and probably will) by agencies and donors
alike. So the ministerial task of matching is not expected to os-
sify rules.
H. Chilling Donor Participation
Disclosure of the entities that encourage employees to
make very large contributions to presidential campaigns
might make some entities more cautious. Disclosed dona-
tions can be explained if they are misunderstood in the
news media. Since it is constitutional for Congress to place
limits on fundraising,89 any indirect deterrence will not
85 See Ayres & Bulow, supra note 18, at 850 (stating that large donors expect their contributions
to yield benefits on policy matters).
86 See Federal Election Commission Panel Discussion, supra note 76, at 241 (discussing that
President will always be involved in agency rulemaking).
87 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993); Jody Freeman,Collaborative Gov-
ernance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) (discussing that recent proposals
have tried to improve agency decision making by implementing cost-benefit analysis); Thomas 0.
McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 36-38 (1981) (discussing that agencies should
use cost-benefit analysis when proposing major rules).
88 See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Ju-
dicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75TEx. L. REv. 483, 483-90 (1997) (describing
ossification of agency rules); Recent Articles of Interest, 23 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8, 9-10 (1998)
(defining ossification as "judicially caused inefficiencies in the adoption of new rules by agencies").
89 See Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq. (1985) (setting forth Congression-
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make public disclosure any less legitimate.
I. Beyond Naivete
Another critique is the jaded Washington sigh, "you just don't
understand how politics works around here." The proposed leg-
islation on transparency of the political money process would be
doomed if the idea of targeted disclosure is dismissed as naive.
Transparency of the political input will never appeal to those
who prefer shadows to sunshine.
Perhaps the perspective of persons who examine the ways of
Washington from the outside appears naive and unsophisticated,
or perhaps, the idea of sunshine will never earn cynics' support.
The belittling and disdain accorded to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act serves as a historical model.90 The controversies over
election contributions disclosure are another model.9 1 As Edward
Kennedy eulogized his brother Robert Kennedy, "some men see
things as they are and ask 'why'; he saw things as they could be
and asked, 'why not?"'92
J. Is It Newsworthy?
For some observers, the political tradeoffs of future policy for
today's campaign cash are not newsworthy. It may be true that
jaded inside-the-Beltway correspondents already know who has
access to whom, and what rules are likely to wither or suddenly
blossom when the green manure is spread in the Rose Garden.
However, it is likely to be very interesting news, for example,
that an EPA rule granting the steel industry's air pollution ex-
clusion - rescuing steelmakers X, Y and Z from a year of lost
productivity - arrived after X, Y and Z political action commit-
tees hosted a fund-raiser for the presidential reelection and that
the agency's permit overseer was queried by White House
staffers on the very next day. The usual ardent denials would
ally imposed contribution limits); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-29 (1975) (holding that provisions
of Campaign Act limiting contributions were constitutional); Cal. Med. Assoc. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182,
199 (1981) (upholding constitutionality of campaign contribution limits).
90 See Wald, supra note 81, at 658 (discussing negative political reaction to Freedom of Informa-
tion Act).
91 See generally SLABACH, supra note 17.
92 See Patricia Brennan, The Kennedy's, An Ambitious, Fascinating and Star-Crossed Family,
WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1992, at Y6 (discussing Edward Kennedy's eulogy of his brother).
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follow. Disclosure can be of benefit even if the news media does
not pursue the news value of disclosed connections with cam-
paign funding.93
K. Death By In-Box
The proposal has an admitted flaw, for it cannot catch the po-
litical act of aborting ideas before they reach the rulemaking or
policy declaration level. After a long career of working with ad-
ministrative agencies, I have observed the phenomenon of "death
by in-box" numerous times.94 An idea bubbles up to the political
level of the administrative agency; the agency head receives calls
or visits from White House political operatives; the proposal is
smothered, and gathers dust in the in-box of the political official.
The systemic problem is that the agency idea is aborted quietly
and never rises to a level at which action is taken;95 so the subtle
killing remains invisible.96
By contrast, agency withdrawal of a regulation is subject to
close scrutiny.97 The agency refusal to proceed with a formal
proposed rule in the face of overwhelming evidence is review-
able98 and sometimes reversed. And in rare cases, granting of a
petition for rulemaking can be ordered by a court to be followed
with a schedule for mandatory adoption of new rules. 99
But the languishing of a rulemaking idea opposed by insider
contributors, left twisting slowly in the wind after the White
House political staffs phone call, is a part of Washington's politi-
cal landscape for which there is no remedy available. The pro-
93 See David Schultz, Proving Political Corruption: Documenting the Evidence Required to Sus-
tain Campaign Finance Reform Laws, 18 REv. LITIG. 85, 96 (1999) (stating that preventing even ap-
pearance of corruption is compelling government interest).
94 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Complete Look at Complexity, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 781, 836
(1998) (describing that administrative agencies can be notoriously slow).
95 The public's first awareness of a rulemaking project is the agency's listing in the semi-annual
Agenda of Regulations, where the projects intended by the agency to become rules are listed, briefly
described, and a timeline is provided.
96 See generally Fred Wertheimer & Susan Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restor-
ing the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1126, 1126 (1996) (stating that by contrast,
when piece of legislation dies after proposal, its demise is duly chronicled and news media criticism
falls on party controlling that House or Senate committee).
97 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (holding
that agency acted capriciously in rescinding safety regulation).
98 See Farmworker Justice Fund Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring
agency to issue rule it had been resisting), vac. as moot, 817 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
99 See Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (ordering agency to re-enact previ-
ously suspended rule).
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posed reform legislation cannot reach and cannot thus illuminate
influences against an idea until the idea has taken on some visi-
ble life. In these cases, the idea's friends within the agency staff,
and advocacy groups outside may combine to re-offer the aborted
rulemaking idea in the form of a petition for agency action. Then
the influence of donors toward denial of a petition for rulemak-
ing would become reportable, and perhaps actionable on judicial
review.
CONCLUSION
Changes to the federal rulemaking process, to enhance trans-
parency of political donor responsibility for action or inaction, may
seem counter-intuitive to cynics who are comfortable with agency
"capture" and policy decisions premised upon the current political
financing systems.
Reform measures cannot inhibit the First Amendment protec-
tions of donors; one must instead expose donor influence to scru-
tiny by the press. With scrutiny, the agencies will be more careful
and the donors will be more hesitant to pour cash into an agency
to obtain the death of an idea. The Political Transparency Report
is a device that may alter the news media coverage of the adminis-
trative bureaucracy's hidden underside. Time will tell if this novel
approach is a success.
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